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Abstract
The LMT→ sequent calculus was introduced in Santos et al. (2016). This paper presents
a Termination proof and a new (more direct) Completeness proof for it.LMT→ is aimed to
be used for proof search in Propositional Minimal Implicational Logic (M→), in a bottom-
up approach. Termination of the calculus is guaranteed by a rule application strategy that
stresses all the possible combinations. For an initial formula α, proofs in LMT→ have
an upper bound of |α| × 2|α|+1+2×log2|α|, which together with the system strategy ensure
decidability. LMT→ has the property to allow extractability of counter-models from failed
proof searches (bicompleteness), i.e., the attempt proof tree of an expanded branch produces
a Kripke model that falsifies the initial formula.
Keywords: Logic; Propositional Minimal Implicational Logic; Sequent Calculus; Proof
Search; Counter-model Generation
1 Introduction
Propositional Minimal Implicational Logic (M→) is the fragment of the Propositional Minimal
Logic containing only the logical connective →.
The TAUT problem forM→, the general problem of deciding if a formula α ∈M→ is always
true, is a PSPACE-Complete problem as stated by Statman (1974), who also shows that this
logic polynomially simulates Propositional Intuitionistic Logic. Statman’s simulation can also
be used to polynomially simulate Propositional Classical Logic. Furthermore, Haeusler (2015)
shows that M→ can polynomially simulate not only Propositional Classical and Intuitionistic
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Logic but also the full Propositional Minimal Logic and any other decidable propositional logic
with a Natural Deduction system where the Subformula Principle holds (see Prawitz (2006)).
Moreover,M→ has a strong relation with open questions about the Computational Complex-
ity Hierarchy as we can see from the statements below.
• If CoNP 6= NP then NP 6= P .
• If PSPACE = NP then CoNP = NP .
• CoNP = NP , iff ∀α ∈ TAUTCla, ∃DS, a deductive system and Π, a proof of α in DS,
size(ΠDS) ≤ Poly(|α|).
• PSPACE = NP iff ∀α ∈ TAUTM→, ∃DS, a deductive system and Π, a proof of α in DS,
size(ΠDS) ≤ Poly(|α|).
Those characteristics show us that M→ is as hard to implement as the most popular propo-
sitional logics. This fact, together with its very simple language (only one logical connective),
makes M→ an important research object that can provide us with many insights about the
aforementioned relations of complexity classes and about the complexity of many other logics.
Moreover, the problem of conducting a proof search in a deductive system forM→ has the com-
plexity of TAUT as a lower bound. Thus, the size of propositional proofs may be huge and
automated theorem provers (ATP) should take care of super-polynomially sized proofs. There-
fore, the study of deductive systems for M→ can directly influence in techniques to improve the
way provers manage such proofs.
In Santos et al. (2016), we presented a sound and complete sequent calculus for M→. We
named it LMT→. This calculus establishes a bottom-up approach for proof search inM→ using
a unified procedure either for provability and counter-model generation. LMT→ was designed to
avoid the usage of loop checkers and mechanisms for backtracking in its implementation. Counter-
model generation (using Kripke semantics) is achieved as a consequence of the way the attempt
proof tree (produced by a failed proof search) is constructed during a proof search process.
In this current work, we present an upper bound to the proof search procedure of LMT→via
translation functions from very known deductive systems forM→(Natural Deduction and Getnzen’s
sequent calculus). We also fix a problem in the LMT→’s Completeness Proof presented in
Santos et al. (2016) that makes the proof presented there not covering every possible case.
We start on the next section (Section 2) with a briefly discussion on the syntax and semantics
ofM→ used through this text. Section 3 discuss some related work and the state of the art in the
field of deductive systems for M→. In Section 4 we summarize the system LMT→ to help the
full understanding to the reader of the results in sequence. Section 5 presents the first translation
function, from Natural Deduction to Gentzen’s sequent calculus. Section 6, the translation from
this last system to LMT→. Finally, Section 7 shows how to use the upper bound of the previous
systems to define an upper bound to LMT→. Section 8 explore the counter-model generation in
LMT→ and presents a new, corrected version of its Completeness Proof. We finish this paper
with a Conclusion Section, dicussing some opened problems and future work.
2 Minimal Implicational Logic
Propositional Minimal Implicational Logic (M→) is the fragment of Propositional Minimal Logic
containing only the logical connective →.
To refer to a M→ language, we use here the symbol L. We can formally define this language
as follows.
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Definition 1 The alphabet of L consists of:
• An enumerable set of propositional symbols, called atoms.
• The bottom symbol (⊥).
• The binary connective (or logical operator) for implication (→).
• parentheses: “(” and “)”.
Definition 2 We can define the general notion of a formula in L inductively:
• Every propositional symbol is a formula in L. We call them atomic formulas.
• ⊥ is an atomic formula.
• If A is a formula in L then ¬A is also a formula.
• If A and B are formulas in L then (A→ B) are also.
As usual, parentheses are used for disambiguation. We use the following conventions through
the text:
• Upper case letters to represent atomic formulas: A, B, C, . . .
• Lower Greek letters to represent generic formulas: α, β, . . .
• Upper case Greek letters are used to represent sets of formulas. For example ∆, Γ, . . .
• If parentheses are omitted, we interpret conjunctions and disjunctions nested left. Impli-
cations are nested right.
The semantics of M→ is the intuitionistic semantics restricted to → only. Thus, given a
propositional language L, a M→ model is a structure 〈U,,V〉, where U is a non-empty set
(worlds),  is a partial order relation on U and V is a function from U into the power set of L,
such that if i, j ∈ U and i  j then V(i) ⊆ V(j). Given a model, the satisfaction relationship |=
between worlds in models and formulas is defined as in Intuitionistic Logic, namely:
• 〈U,,V〉 |=i p, p ∈ L, iff, p ∈ V(i)
• 〈U,,V〉 |=i α1 → α2, iff, for every j ∈ U , such that i  j, if 〈U,,V〉 |=j α1 then
〈U,,V〉 |=j α2.
As usual a formula α is valid in a modelM, namelyM |= α, if and only if, it is satisfiable in
every world i of the model, namely ∀i ∈ U,M |=i α. A formula is a M
→ tautology, if and only
if, it is valid in every model.
3 Related Work
It is known that Prawitz’s Natural Deduction System for Propositional Minimal Logic with
only the →-rules (→-Elim and →-Intro) is sound and complete for the M→ regarding Kripke
semantics. As a consequence of this, Gentzen’s LJ system (Gentzen, 1935) containing only right
and left →-rules is also sound and complete.
Gentzen (1935) also proved the decision problem for Int (which includes the case ofMin and
M→). However, Gentzen’s approach was not conceived to be a bottom-up proof search procedure.
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Figure 1 shows structural and logic rules of an adapted Gentzen’s sequent calculus forM→, called
LJ→. We restrict the right side of a sequent to one and only one formula (we are in M→ thus
sequents with empty right side does not make sense). This restriction implies that structural rules
can only be considered for main formulas on the left side of a sequent. LJ→ also incorporates
contraction in the →-left, with the repetition of the main formula of the conclusion on the
premises. We use those adaptations to facilitate in explaining the difficulties in using sequent
calculus systems for proof search in Int, Min and M→. Dyckhoff (2016) describes in details
the evolution of those adaptations over Gentzen’s original LJsystem in attempts to establishes
better bottom-up proof search mechanisms for Int.
A central aspect when considering mechanisms for proof search in M→ (and also for Int)
is the application of the →-left rule. The LK system proposed by Gentzen (1935), the sequent
calculus for Classical Logic, with some adaptations (e.g. Seldin (1998)) can ensure that each
rule, when applied in a bottom-up manner in the proof search, reduces the degree (the number
of atomic symbols occurrences and connectives in a formula) of the main formula of the sequent
(the formula to which the rule is applied) implying the termination of the system. However, the
case for Int is more complicated. First, we have the “context-splitting” (using an expression from
Dyckhoff (2016)) nature of →-left, i.e., the formula on the right side of the conclusion sequent is
lost in the left premise of the rule application. Second, as we can reuse a hypothesis in different
parts of a proof, the main formula of the conclusion must be available to be used again by the
generated premises. Thus, the→-left rule has the repetition of the main formula in the premises,
a scenario that allows the occurrence of loops in automatic procedures.
axiom
∆, γ ⇒ γ
∆⇒ γ
weakening (w)
α,∆⇒ γ
α, α,∆⇒ γ
contraction (c)
α,∆⇒ γ
Γ, α, β,∆⇒ γ
exchange (e)
Γ, β, α,∆⇒ γ
∆⇒ α α,Γ⇒ γ
cut
∆,Γ⇒ γ
∆, α⇒ β
→-right (→-r)
∆⇒ α→ β
∆, α→ β ⇒ α ∆, α→ β, β ⇒ γ
→-left (→-l)
∆, α→ β ⇒ γ
Figure 1: Rules of Gentzen’s LJ
Since Gentzen, many others have explored solutions to deal with the challenges aforemen-
tioned proposing new calculi (sets of rules), strategies and proof search procedures to allow more
automated treatment to the problem.
Unfortunately, the majority of these results are focused in Int, with very few work specifically
dedicated to Min or M→. Thus, we needed to concentrate our literature review in the Int case,
adjusting the found results to the M→ context by ourselves.
A crucial source of information was the work of Dyckhoff (2016), properly entitled “Intuition-
istic decision procedures since Gentzen” that summarizes in chronological order the main results
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of this field. By means of personal communication, we had access to a preprint version of the
document, which helps us a lot in conducting the research. In the next paragraphs, we highlight
the most important of those results presented in Dyckhoff (2016).
A common way to control the proof search procedure inM→ (and in Int) is by the definition
of routines for loop verification as proposed in Underwood (1990). Loop checkers are very
expensive procedures, although they are effective to guarantee termination in automatic provers
forM→ (and other logics with the same characteristic). The work in Heuerding et al. (1996) and
Howe (1997) are examples of techniques that can be used to minimize the performance problems
that can arise with the usage of such procedures.
To avoid the use of loop checkers, Dyckhoff (1992) proposed a terminating contraction-
free sequent calculus for Int, named LJT, using a technique based on the work of Vorobev
(1970) in the 50s. Pinto and Dyckhoff (1995) extended this work showing a method to generate
counter-examples in this system. They proposed two calculi, one for proof search and another
for counter-model generation, forming a way to decide about the validity or not of formulas in
Int. A characteristic of their systems is that the subformula property does not hold on them. In
Ferrari et al. (2013), a similar approach is presented using systems where the subformula prop-
erty holds. They also proposed a single decision procedure for Int which guarantee minimal
depth counter-model.
Focused sequent calculi appeared initially in the Andreoli’s work on linear logic (Andreoli,
1992). The author identified a subset of proofs from Gentzen-style sequent calculus, which are
complete and tractable. Liang and Miller (2007) proposed the focused sequent calculi LJF where
they used a mapping of Int into linear logic and adapted the Andreoli’s system to work with
the image. Dyckhoff and Lengrand (2006) presented the focused system LJQ that work direct
in Int. Focusing is used in their system as a way to implement restrictions in the →-left rule
as proposed by Vorobev (1970) and Hudelmaier (1993). The work of Dyckhoff and Lengrand
(2006) follows from the calculus with the same name presented in Herbelin (1995).
Dyckhoff (2016) also identify a list of features particularly of interest when evaluating mech-
anisms for proof search in Int that we will follow when comparing our solution to the other
existent ones. They are: termination (proof search procedure stops both for theorems and
non-theorem formulas), bicompleteness (extractability of models from failed proof searches),
avoidance of backtracking (which is a very immediate approach to deal with the context split
in →-left, but it is also a complex and expensive procedure to implement), simplicity (allows
easier reasoning about systems).
4 The Deductive System LMT→
The system LMT→ was introduced in Santos et al. (2016). LMT→ is sequent based deductive
system for proof search in M→. As such, it is based in a particular definition of a sequent, a set
of rules and a termination strategy. To facilitate the reader’s understanding we summarize these
main definitions in this section and enunciate through the text the propositions and theorems
around LMT→ established in the original aforementioned source.
In LMT→, a sequent has the following general form:
{∆′},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , ...,Υ
pn
n ,∆⇒ [p1, p2, ..., pn], ϕ (1)
where ϕ is a formula in L and ∆, Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , ...,Υ
pn
n are bags
1 of formulas. Each Υpii represents
formulas associated with an atomic formula pi.
1A bag (or a multiset) is a generalization of the concept of a set that, unlike a set, takes repetitions into
account: a bag {A, A, B} is not the same as the bag {A, B}.
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Authors named the bracket areas of the sequent as focus areas. Curly brackets are used to
control the application of the→-left rule and square brackets are used to keep control of formulas
that are related to a particular counter-model definition.
∆′ is a set of formulas and p1, p2, ..., pn is a sequence that does not allow repetition. A context
of the sequent is a pair (α, q), where α ∈ ∆′ and ϕ = q, where q is an atomic formula on the
right side of the sequent.
Rules are inspired by their backward application. The axioms and rules of LMT→ are
presented in Figure 2.
Axiom:
axiom
{∆′, q},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , . . . ,Υ
pn
n ,∆⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], q
Focus:
{∆′, α},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , . . . ,Υ
pn
n ,∆, α⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], β
fα
{∆′},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , . . . ,Υ
pn
n ,∆, α⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], β
Restart:
{},Υ1,Υ2, . . . ,Υi,Υ
pi+1
i+1 , . . . ,Υ
pn
n ,∆
q ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pi+1, . . . , pn, q], pi
rpi
{∆′},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , . . . ,Υ
pi
i ,Υ
pi+1
i+1 , . . . ,Υ
pn
n ,∆⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pi, pi+1, . . . , pn], q
→-Right
{∆′},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , . . . ,Υ
pn
n ,∆, α⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], β →-rα→β
{∆′},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , . . . ,Υ
pn
n ,∆⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], α→ β
→-Left
Considering Υ =
n⋃
i=1
Υpii and p¯ = p1, p2, . . . , pn, we have:
{α→ β,∆′},Υ,∆q,∆⇒ [p¯, q], α {α→ β,∆′},Υ,∆, β ⇒ [p¯], q
→-l(α→β,q)
{α→ β,∆′}Υ,∆⇒ [p¯], q
Figure 2: Rules of LMT→
To achieve completeness, LMT→ depends on a proof search strategy that defines a specific
way to label the proof tree during the proving process. In a →-left rule application, the atomic
formula, q, on the right side of the conclusion goes to the []-area in the left premise. ∆ formulas
in the conclusion are copied to the left premise and marked with a label relating each of them
with q. The left premise also has a copy of ∆ formulas without the q-label. This mechanism
keeps track of proving attempts. In Santos et al. (2016), authors describe this strategy as follows:
1. Apply →-right rule if it is possible, i.e., if the formula on the right side of the sequent,
outside the []-area, is not atomic. The premise generated by this application is the new
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goal of this branch.
2. Choose one formula on the left side of the sequent, not labeled yet, i.e., a formula α ∈ ∆
that is not occurring in ∆′, then apply the focus rule. The premise generated by this
application is the new goal of this branch.
3. If all formulas on the left side have already been focused, choose the first formula α ∈ ∆′
such that the context (α, q) was not yet tried since the last application of a restart rule.
We say that a context (α, q) is already tried when a formula α on the left was expanded (by
the application of →-left rule) with q as the formula outside the []-area on the right side
of the sequent. The premises generated by this application are new goals of the respective
new branches.
4. Choose the leftmost formula inside the []-area that was not chosen before in this branch
and apply the restart rule. The premise generated by this application is the new goal of
the branch.
Authors also stated and proved the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Given that the bag of goals contains only one copy of {∆′},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , ...,Υ
pn
n ,∆⇒
[p1, p2, . . . , pn], ϕ then, based on the aforementioned strategy, LMT
→ eventually stops.
And, consequentelly, the following observations about a tree generated during a proving
process by LMT→:
Observation 1 (i) A top sequent is the highest sequent of a branch in the tree.
(ii) In a top sequent of a branch on the form of sequent (1), if ϕ ∈ ∆ then the top sequent is
an axiom and the branch is called a closed branch. Otherwise, we say that the branch is
open and ϕ is an atomic formula.
(iii) In every sequent of the tree, ∆′ ⊆ ∆.
(iv) For i = 1, . . . n, Υ
pi−1
i−1 ⊆ Υ
pi
i .
In Santos et al. (2016) readers can also find an attempt proof tree schema based on the
aforementioned strategy.
5 Translating from ND→ to LJ→
Hirokawa has presented an upper bound for the size of normal form Natural Deduction proofs
of implicational formulas in Int (that correspond to M→ formulas). Hirokawa (1991) showed
that, for a formula α ∈ M→, this limit is |α| · 2|α|+1. As the Hirokawa result concerns about
normal proofs in Natural Deduction we present now a translation of this system to a cut-free
sequent calculus, following the LJ→ rules presented in Section 4, thus we can establish the limit
for proof search in LJ→ too, which we will use in the next Chapter to establish a bound for the
system LMT→.
Figure 3 presents a recursively defined function2 to translate Natural Deduction normal proofs
of M→ formulas into LJ→ proofs (in a version of the system without the cut rule).
2We use a semicolon to separate arguments of functions (in function definitions and function calls) instead
of the most common approach to using commas. This change in convention aims to avoid confusion with the
commas used to separate formulas and sets of formulas in sequent notation.
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Axioms:
F (α; Γ) = Γ, α⇒ α
Case of →Introduction:
F


[α]1∏
β
→-I1
α→ β
; Γ

 =
F


α∏
β
; {α} ∪ Γ


→ r
Γ⇒ α→ β
Case of →Elimination:
F


∏
1
α α→ β
β∏
2
C
; Γ


=
F
( ∏
1
α
; {α→ β} ∪ Γ
)
F


β∏
2
C
; {α→ β} ∪ Γ


→ l
→ −lc

c
(
F
( ∏
1
α
; {α→ β} ∪ Γ
))
; c

F


β∏
2
C
; {α→ β} ∪ Γ



 ;α→ β


Figure 3: A recursively defined function to translate Natural Deduction proofs into LJ→
In this definition, c is a function that returns the conclusion (last sequent) of a LJ→ demon-
stration as showed in (2). Also, → −lc is a function that receives two LJ→ sequents and a
formula to construct the conclusion of a → −left rule application, as defined in (3).
c
( ∏
Γ⇒ γ
)
= Γ⇒ γ (2)
→ −lc(Γ⇒ α;β,Γ⇒ γ;α→ β) = Γ, α→ β ⇒ γ (3)
As an example of the translation produced by the function of Figure 3, we show below each
step of the translation of a Natural Deduction proof (4) into an LJ→ proof (5). To shorten the
size of the proofs we collapsed repeated occurrences of formulas when passed as the hypothesis
argument of the recursive function call.
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[B]2
[A]1 [A→ (B → C)]3
→-E
B → C
→-E
C
→-I1
A→ C
→-I2
B → (A→ C)
→-I3
(A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
(4)
▽
F


[A→ (B → C)]3∏
1
B → (A→ C)
→-I3
(A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
; ∅


▽
F


[B]2, A→ (B → C)∏
2
A→ C
→-I2
B → (A→ C)
; {A→ (B → C)}


→ r
⇒ (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
▽
F


[A]1, B, A→ (B → C)∏
3
C
→-I1
A→ C
; {B,A→ (B → C)}


→ r
A→ (B → C)⇒ B → (A→ C)
→ r
⇒ (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
▽
F

 B
A A→ (B → C)
→-E
B → C
→-E
C
; {A,B,A→ (B → C)}


→ r
B,A→ (B → C)⇒ A→ C
→ r
A→ (B → C)⇒ B → (A→ C)
→ r
⇒ (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
In the following steps consider that Γ = {A,B,A→ (B → C)}.
▽
F (A; Γ) F
(
B B → C
→-E
C
; Γ
)
→ l
→ −lc
(
c (F (A; Γ)) ; c
(
F
(
B B → C
→-E
C
; Γ
))
;A→ (B → C)
)
→ r
B,A→ (B → C)⇒ A→ C
→ r
A→ (B → C)⇒ B → (A→ C)
→ r
⇒ (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
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▽Γ⇒ A
F (B; {Γ, B → C)} F (C; {Γ, B → C)}
→ l
→ −lc(c(F (B; {Γ, B → C)}); c(F (C; {Γ, B → C)});B → C)
→ l
Γ⇒ C
→ r
B,A→ (B → C)⇒ A→ C
→ r
A→ (B → C)⇒ B → (A→ C)
→ r
⇒ (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
▽
Γ⇒ A
Γ, B → C ⇒ B Γ, B → C,C ⇒ C
→ l
Γ, B → C ⇒ C
→ l
Γ⇒ C
→ r
B,A→ (B → C)⇒ A→ C
→ r
A→ (B → C)⇒ B → (A→ C)
→ r
⇒ (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C)) (5)
Theorem 1 The size of proofs in LJ→ considering only implicational tautologies is the same of
that in Natural Deduction, i.e. for an implicational formula α, a proof in LJ→ has maximum
height of |α| · 2|α|+1.
Proof 1 This proof follows directly from the translation function aforementioned as each step in
the Natural Deduction proof is translated into exactly one step in the LJ→ resultant proof.
6 Translating from LJ→ to LMT→
Using the same approach applied in Section 5, we now propose a translation from LJ→ proofs
into the system LMT→. The translation function needs to adapt a sequent in LJ→ form to a
sequent in LMT→ form. Figure 4 presents the definition of the translation function3.
We use some abbreviations to shorten the function definition of Figure 4. We present them
below.
D′1= F
′
(
D1
Γ, α→ β ⇒ α
;∆ ∪ {α→ β}; Υ ∪ Γq ∪ {(α→ β)q}; Σ ∪ {q}; Π′
)
D′2= F
′
(
D2
Γ, β ⇒ q
;∆ ∪ {α→ β}; Υ;Σ; Π′
)
Π′ = PROOFUNTIL
(
FOCUS
(
{∆},Υ,Γ, α→ β ⇒ [Σ], q
Π
))
Γq =
means that all formulas of the set Γ are labeled with a reference to the
atomic formula q
3As in Section 5, we use semicolon to separate function arguments here
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Axioms:
F
′ (Γ, α⇒ α;∆;Υ;Σ; Π) =
{∆},Υ,Γ, α⇒ [Σ], α∏
Last rule is →-right:
F
′

 DΓ, α⇒ β
→-r
Γ⇒ α→ β
;∆;Υ;Σ; Π

 =
F
′
(
D
Γ, α⇒ β
;∆;Υ;Σ;
{∆},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], α→ β∏
)
→ r
{∆},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], α→ β
Π
Last rule is →-left:
F
′

 D1Γ, α→ β ⇒ α
D2
Γ, β ⇒ q
→-l
Γ, α→ β ⇒ q
;∆;Υ;Σ;Π

 =
D′1 D
′
2
→ l
PROOFUNTIL
(
FOCUS
(
{∆},Υ,Γ, α→ β ⇒ [Σ], q
Π
))
Figure 4: A recursive function to translate LJ→ into LMT→
(α→ β)q= means the same for the individual formula α→ β.
The complex case occurs when the function F ′ is applied to a proof fragment in which the last
LJ→ rule applied is an →-left. In this case, F ′ needs to inspect the proof fragment constructed
until that point to identify whether the context (α → β, q) was already used or not. This
inspection has to be done since LMT→ does not allow two or more applications of the same
context between two applications of the restart rule. To deal with this, we use some auxiliary
functions described below.
FOCUS is a function that receives a fragment of proof in LMT→ form and builds one
application of the focus rule on the top of the proof fragment received in the case that the main
formula of the rule is not already focused. The main formula is also an argument of the function.
In the function definition (6), we have the constraint that α ∈ Γ.
FOCUS


{∆},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], β∏
{} ⇒ [], γ
;α

 =
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

{∆, α},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], β
focus
{∆},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], β∏
{} ⇒ [], γ
if α /∈ ∆
{∆},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], β∏
{} ⇒ [], γ
otherwise


(6)
The function PROOFUNTIL also receives a fragment of a proof in LMT→ form where
(α→ β, q) is one of the available contexts, applies the restart rule with an atomic formula p such
that p ∈ Σ in the top of this fragment of proof and, then, conducts a sequence of LMT→ rule
applications following the strategy aforementioned until the point that the context (α → β, q)
is available again. This mechanism has to be done in the case that the context (α → β, q) is
already applied in an →-left application, some point after the last restart rule application in the
proof fragment received as the argument Π. Otherwise, the proof fragment is returned unaltered.
Function PROOFUNTIL is described in the function definition (7).
PROOFUNTIL


{∆, α→ β},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], q∏
{} ⇒ [], γ

 =


{∆′′, α→ β},Υ′′,Γ′ ⇒ [Σ′′], q
...
{},Υ′,Γq,Γ⇒ [Σ′], p
restart−p
{∆, α→ β},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], q∏
{} ⇒ [], γ
→ -left(α→ β, q) ∈
∏
{∆, α→ β},Υ,Γ⇒ [Σ], q∏
{} ⇒ [], γ
otherwise


(7)
We use here the formula ((((A→ B)→ A)→ A)→ B)→ B, as an example of this trans-
lation. We know from Dowek and Jiang (2006) that this formula needs two repetitions of the
hypothesis (((A→ B)→ A)→ A)→ B to be proved in M→.
To shorten the proof tree we use the following abbreviation: ((A→ B)→ A)→ A = ǫ. Thus,
its normal proof in Natural Deduction can be represented as shown in Proof (8).
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[A]1
ǫ → I
4
[ǫ→ B]3
B
→ E
(A→ B)
→ I1
[(A→ B)→ A]2
A
→ E
ǫ → E
2
[ǫ→ B]3
B
→ E
(ǫ→ B)→ B
→ I3
(8)
Using the translation presented in Figure 3, we achieve the following LJ→ cut-free proof. To
shorten the proof we numbered each subformula of the initial formula that we want to prove and
use these numbers to refer to those subformulas all over the proof. Let us call this LJ→ version
of the proof D (Proof (9)).
→3,→1, A,→1⇒ A
→-R
→3,→1, A⇒→2 →3,→1, A,B ⇒ B
→-L
→3,→1, A⇒ B
→-R→3,→1⇒→0 →3,→1, A⇒ A
→-L
→3,→1⇒ A
→-R→3⇒→2 →3, B ⇒ B
→-L
→3⇒ B
→-R
⇒ ((((A →0 B)→1 A)→2 A)→3 B)→4 B
(9)
The translation to LMT→ starts by applying the function F ′ to the full proof D.
F ′

 D;
Γ = ∅;
∆ = ∅;
Υ = ∅;
Σ = ∅;
Π = nil


This first call of F ′ produces the end sequent of the proof in LMT→ and calls the function
F ′ recursively to the rest of the original proof in LJ→. This LJ→ fragment has now, as its last
rule application, an →-left.
∏
= {} ⇒ [], ((((A →0 B)→1 A)→2 A)→3 B)→4 B
F ′


D1
→3⇒→2 →3, B ⇒ B
→-l
→3⇒ B
;
Γ = ∅;
∆ = ∅;
Υ = ∅;
Σ = ∅;
Π


→ r∏
Then, as the main formula (((A →0 B) →1 A) →2 A) →3 B (in the proof represented only
by →3) is not focused yet, the call of function F
′ first constructs an application of the focus rule
on the top of the Π fragment received as a function argument. Also, the context (→3, B) was
not expanded yet. Thus, the recursive step can proceed directly without the need of a restart
(this is controlled by the PROOFUNTIL function as shown in F ′ definition in Figure 4).
∏
=
{→3},→3⇒ [],B
→ focus
{},→3⇒ [], B
→ r
{} ⇒ [], ((((A →0 B)→1 A)→2 A)→3 B)→4 B
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F ′


D2
→3⇒→2
;
Γ = {→3};
∆ = {→3};
Υ = {→B3 };
Σ = {B};
Π

 F ′

 →3, B ⇒ B ;
Γ = {→3};
∆ = {→3};
Υ = ∅;
Σ = ∅;
Π


→ l∏
The call of F ′ on the right premise constructs an axiom. Thus this branch in the LMT→ proof
translation being built is closed. The next recursive call ”pastes” on the top of the right branch
of the new version of Π as follows.
∏
=
{→3},→
B
3 ,→3⇒ [B],→2 {→3},→3, B ⇒ [], B
→ l
{→3},→3⇒ [],B
→ focus
{},→3⇒ [], B
→ r
{} ⇒ [], ((((A →0 B)→1 A)→2 A)→3 B)→4 B
F ′


D3
→3,→1⇒→0 →3, A⇒ A
→-L
→3,→1⇒ A
;
Γ = {→3};
∆ = {→3};
Υ = {→B3 };
Σ = {B};
Π


→ r∏
This process goes until a point where the context (→3, B) is again found, and the translation
needs to deal with a restart in the LMT→ translated proof. This situation happens when the
recursion of F ′ reaches the point below.
F ′


D4
→3,→1, A⇒→2 →3,→1, A,B ⇒ B
→-L
→3,→1, A⇒ B
;
Γ = {→1, A};
∆ = {→3,→1};
Υ = {→B3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 };
Σ = {B,A};
Π


The Π fragment constructed in this step of the recursion is presented below.
∏′
{→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→3,→1⇒ [B,A],→0 {→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→3,→1, A⇒ [B], A
{→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→3,→1⇒ [B],A
→ l
{→3},→
B
3 ,→3,→1⇒ [B],A
→ focus
{→3},→
B
3 ,→3⇒ [B],→2
→ r
{→3},→3, B ⇒ [],B
{→3},→3⇒ [], B
→ l
{},→3⇒ [],B
→ focus
{} ⇒ [], ((((A→0 B) →1 A) →2 A) →3 B) →4 B
→ r
The Π′ fragment in Π is built as the result of a proof search from the top sequent of the
leftmost branch of Π until the point that there is a repetition of the context (→3, B) and the
→-left rule can be applied again without offending the LMT→ strategy. This result is produced
by the PROOFUNTIL call when applying F ′ to an LJ→ fragment that end with a →-left rule
application.
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∏′
1
∏′
2
→-l
{→3},→B3 ,→3,→1,→
B
1 , A
B ,→B3 ⇒ [B], A
focus
{},→B3 ,→3,→1,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ⇒ [B], A
restart
{→3,→1},→B3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→1, A,→3⇒ [B,A],B
where Π′1 is:
{→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ,→3,→1, A ⇒ [B,A], B
→-r
{→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ,→3,→1⇒ [B,A],→0 {→3},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ,→3,→1, A ⇒ [B,A], A
→-l
{→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ,→3,→1⇒ [B,A], A
focus
{→3},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ,→3,→1⇒ [B,A], A
→-r
{→3},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ,→3,→1⇒ [B,A],→2
and Π′2 is:
{→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 , B
A,→3,→1, B,A ⇒ [B,A], B
→-r
{→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 , B
A,→3,→1, B ⇒ [B,A],→0 {→3, to1},→
B
3 ,→3,→1,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 , B,A ⇒ [B],A
→-l
{→3,→1},→
B
3 ,→3,→1,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 , B ⇒ [B], A
focus
{→3},→
B
3 ,→3,→1,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 , B ⇒ [B], A
The top sequent of the fragment Π′1 is the point where we can apply the →-left rule to the
context (→3, B) again. Thus the next recursion call becomes:
Π′3 Π
′
4 → l
Π
where
∏′
3 =
F ′


→3,→1, A⇒ A
→3,→1, A⇒→2
;
Γ = {→3,→1, A};
∆ = {→3,→1};
Υ = {→A3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
3 ,→
B
1 , A
B};
Σ = {B,A};
Π


and
∏′
4 =
F ′

 →3,→1, A,B ⇒ B ;
Γ = {→3,→1, A};
∆ = {→3,→1};
Υ = {→A3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
3 ,→
B
1 , A
B};
Σ = {B,A};
Π


Finally, after finish the translation process we obtained the translated proof of (10).
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{→3,→1},→B3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ,→3,→1, A⇒ [B,A],A
{→3,→1},→B3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B,→B3 ,→3,→1, A⇒ [B,A],→2
→ r
{→3,→1},→B3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→
B
1 , A
B ,→B3 ,→3,→1, A⇒ [B,A], A
Π′
{→3,→1},→B3 ,→
A
3 ,→
A
1 ,→3,→1⇒ [B,A],→0
{→3,→1},→B3 ,→3,→1⇒ [B], A
→ l
{→3,→1},→B3 ,→3,→1, A⇒ [B], A
{→3},→B3 ,→3,→1⇒ [B], A
→ focus
{→3},→B3 ,→3⇒ [B],→2
→ r
{→3},→3, B ⇒ [], B
{→3},→3⇒ [],B
→ l
{},→3⇒ [], B
→ focus
{} ⇒ [], ((((A →0 B)→1 A)→2 A)→3 B)→4 B
→ r
(10)
1
6
7 An Upper Bound to LMT→
To control the end of the proof search procedure of LMT→ our approach is to define an upper
bound limit to the size of its proof search tree. Then, we need to show that the LMT→ strategy
here proposed allows exploring all the possible ways to expand the proof tree until it reaches this
size.
From Theorem 1, we know that the upper bound for cut-free proofs based on LJ→ is
|α| · 2|α|+1, where α is the initial formula that we want to prove. We use the translation presented
in Figure 4 on the previous Section to find a similar limit for LMT→proofs. We have to analyze
three cases to establish an upper bound for LMT→.
The cases are described bellow and are summarized in Table 1.
(i) Axioms of LJ→ maps one to one with axioms of LMT→;
(ii) →-right applications of LJ→ maps one to one with →-right applications of LMT→;
(iii) →-left applications of LJ→ maps to LMT→ in three different possible sub-cases, according
to the context (α → β, q) in which the rule is being applied in LJ→. We have to consider
the fragment of LMT→ already translated to decide the appropriate case.
• If the context is not yet focused neither expanded
Then, one application of→-left in LJ→ maps to two applications of rules
in LMT→: first, a focus application, then an →-left application.
• If the context is already focused but not yet expanded
Then, one application of →-left in LJ→ maps to one application of →-
left in LMT→.
• If the context (α→ β, q) is already focused and expanded
Then, the one application of →-left in LJ→ maps to the height of the
LMT→ proof fragment produced by the execution of the PROOFUNTIL
function. Let this height be called h.
LJ→ LMT→ Map
axiom axiom 1:1
→-right →-right 1:1
focused expanded
→-left
No No 1:2 1 focus and 1 →-left
Yes No 1:1 1 →-left
Yes Yes 1:h 1 to the size of PROOFUNTIL
Table 1: Mapping the size of LJ→ proofs into LMT→
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Lemma 1 The height h that defines the size of the proof fragment returned by the function
PROOFUNTIL has a maximum limit of 22log2|α|, where α is the main formula of the initial
sequent of the proof in LMT→.
Proof 2 Consider a proof
∏
LJ→
of an initial sequent in LJ→ with the form ⇒ α. The process
of translating
∏
LJ→
to LMT→ produces a proof
∏
LMT→
with the initial sequent in the form
{} ⇒ [], α. Consider that α has the form α1 → α2. In some point of the translation to LMT
→,
we reach a point where a context (ψ → ϕ, q) is already focused and expanded in the already
translated part of the proof
∏
LMT→
. At this point, the function PROOFUNTIL generates a
fragment of the proof
∏
LMT→
, call it Σ of size h. The height h is bound by the number of
applications of →-left rules in Σ. This can be determined by the multiplication of the degree of
the formula α1 (that bounds the number of possible implicational formulas in the left side of a
sequent in LMT→) by the maximum number of atomic formulas (n) inside the []-area in the
highest branch of Σ (each pi inside the []-area allows one application of the restart rule). Thus
we can formalize this in the following manner:
h = n× |α1|
h = |α| × |α|
h = |α|2
Since
|α|2 = 22·log2|α|
Then, we have that
h = 22·log2|α|
Theorem 2 The size of a proof for a formula α ∈ M→ in LMT→ has an upper bound of
|α| · 2|α|+1+2·log2|α|.
Proof 3 Considering the size of proofs for a formula α using LJ→, the mapping in Table 1 and
the Lemma 1, the proof follows directly.
Theorem 3 LMT→ eventually stops.
Proof 4 To guarantee termination, we use the upper bound presented in Theorem 2 to limit
the height of opened branches during the LMT→ proof search process. The strategy presented in
Section 4 forces an ordered application of rules that produces all possible combination of formulas
to be expanded in the right and left sides of generated sequents. In other words, when the upper
bound is reached the proof search had, for sure, stressed all possible expansions until that point.
• →-right rule is applied until we obtain an atomic formula on the right side.
• focus rule is applied until every non-labeled formula become focused. The same formula can
not be focused twice unless a restart rule is applied.
• →-left rule can not be applied more than once to the same context unless a restart rule is
applied.
• between two applications of the restart rule in a branch there is only one possible application
of a →-left rule for a context (α, q). α and q are always subformulas of the initial formula.
• restart rule is applied for each atomic formula that appears on the right side of sequents in
a branch in the order of its appearance in the []-area, which means that proof search will
apply the restart rule for each pi, i = 1, . . . n until the branch reaches the defined limit.
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8 Counter-model Generation in LMT→
8.1 Soundness
Soundness of LMT→ were stated in Santos et al. (2016). To be proved, authors used definitions
of what is a valid sequent and what is a valid rule in LMT→. For facilitate reader understanding,
we repeat them here:
Definition 3 A sequent {∆′},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , . . . ,Υ
pn
n ,∆⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], ϕ is valid, if and only if,
∆′,∆ |= ϕ or ∃i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) |= pi, for i = 1, . . . n.
Definition 4 We say that a rule is sound, if and only if, in the case of the premises of the
sequent are valid sequents, then its conclusion also is.
From the last, we say that a calculus is sound, if and only if, each of its rules is sound. We
prove the soundness of LMT→ by showing that this is the case for each one of its rules. Thus,
Santos et al. (2016) states the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Considering validity of a sequent as defined in Definition 3, LMT→ is sound.
8.2 Completeness
In Santos et al. (2016) we can find a previous but incomplete Completeness Proof of LMT→. The
one presented there (that is also a method to extract counter-models from failed proof searches)
does not comprehend all possible cases. For example, the Dummett formula ((A→ B)∨(B → A))
in its implicational version (see Section 9 below) needs a Kripke counter-model with at least two
branches to be falsified in M→. Our previous method fails in provide this counter-model for
formulas with this characteristic.
Although the general structure of the proof continues the same (definitions, lemmas and the
final proposition) presented previously, we change details in many of its parts. Thus, we decided
to present the full new Completeness Proof here to facilitate reader’s understanding. It follows
below.
Remember that the upper bound shown in section 7 can also be used as an upper bound to
the counter-model generated by our method.
By Observation 1.ii we know that a top sequent of an open branch in an attempt proof tree
has the general form below, where q is an atomic formula:
{∆′},Υp11 ,Υ
p2
2 , ...,Υ
pn
n ,∆⇒ [p1, p2, ..., pn], q
From Definition 3 and considering that ∆′ ∈ ∆ in any sequent of an attempt proof tree
following our proposed strategy, we can define a invalid sequent as follows:
Definition 5 A sequent is invalid if and only if ∆ 2 q and ∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) 2 pi, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Our proof of the completeness starts with a definition about atomic formulas in the left and
right side of a top sequent.
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Definition 6 We can construct a Kripke counter-model M that satisfies atomic formulas in the
right side of a top sequent and that falsifies the atomic formula on the left. This construction
can be done in the following way:
1. The model M has an initial world w0.
2. By the proof strategy, we can conclude that, in any sequent of the proof tree, Υp11 ⊆ Υ
p2
2 ⊆
· · · ⊆ Υpnn ⊆ ∆. We create a world in the model M corresponding for each one of these
bags of formulas and, using the inclusion relation between them, we define a respective
accessibility relation in the model M between such worlds. That is, we create worlds
wΥp11 , wΥ
p2
2
, . . . , wΥpnn , w∆ related in the following form: wΥp11  wΥ
p2
2
 · · ·  wΥpnn  w∆.
As w0 is the first world of M, it precedes wΥp11 , that is, w0  wΥ
p1
1
is also included in the
accessibility relation. If Υpii = Υ
pi+1
i+1 , for i = 1, . . . , n, then the associated worlds that
correspond to those sets have to be collapsed in a single world wΥpii −Υ
pi+1
i+1
. In this case, the
previous relation wΥpii
 w
Υ
pi+1
i+1
is removed from the  relation of the model M and the
pairs w
Υ
pi−1
i−1
 wΥpii
and w
Υ
pi+1
i+1
 w
Υ
pi+2
i+2
become respectively w
Υ
pi−1
i−1
 w
Υ
pi
i −Υ
pi+1
i+1
and
w
Υ
pi
i −Υ
pi+1
i+1
 w
Υ
pi+2
i+2
.
3. By the Definition 5 of an invalid sequent, ∆ 2 q. The world w∆ will be used to guarantee
this. We set q false in w∆, i.e, M 2w∆ q. We also set every atomic formula that is in ∆
as true, i.e., ∀p, p ∈ ∆,M w∆ p.
4. By the Definition 5 of an invalid sequent, we also need that ∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) 2 pi, for i = 1, . . . n.
Thus, for each i, i = 1, . . . , n we setM 2w
Υ
pi
i
pi and ∀p, p ∈ Υ
pi
i , being p an atomic formula,
M w
Υ
pi
i
p. In the case of collapsed worlds, we keep the satisfaction relation of the previous
individual worlds in the collapsed one.
5. In w0 set every atomic formula inside the []-area (all of them are atomic) as false. That
is, M 2w0 pi, for i = 1, . . . , n. We also set the atomic formula outside the []-area false in
this world: M 2w0 q. Those definitions make w0 consistent with the  relation of M.
The Figure 5 shows the general shape of counter-models following the steps enumerated
above. This procedure to construct counter-model allows us to state the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let S be a top sequent of an open branch in an attempt proof tree generated by the
strategy presented in Section 4. Then we can construct a Kripke model M with a world u where
M 2u S, using the aforementioned counter-model generation procedure.
Proof 5 We can prove this by induction on the degree of formulas in ∆. From Definition 6,
items 3 and 4 we know the value of each atomic formula in the worlds w∆ and in each world
wΥpii
. The inductive hypothesis is that every formula in ∆ is true in w∆. Thus, as Υ
p1
1 ⊆ Υ
p2
2 ⊆
· · · ⊆ Υpnn ⊆ ∆, every formula in Υ
pi
i is true in wΥpii
, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Thus, we have two cases to consider:
1. The top sequent is in the rightmost branch of the proof tree ([]-area is empty).
Let α → β be a formula in M→ that is in ∆. We show that M w∆ α → β. In this case,
by the proof strategy, β ≡ (β1 → (β2 → · · · → (βm → p))), where p is an atomic formula.
By Definition 6.3 w∆ p. As w∆ has no accessible world from it (except for itself), w∆ β.
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w0
2 p1, . . . , pn
2 q
w
Υ
p1
1
∀p, p ∈ Υp11 , p atomic,  p
2 p1
...
wΥpnn
∀p, p ∈ Υpnn , p atomic,  p
2 pn
w∆
∀p, p ∈ ∆ , p atomic,  p
2 q
Figure 5: General schema of counter-models
By the proof strategy, βm → p, βm−1 → βm → p, . . . , β2 → · · · → βm−1 → βm → p, β1 →
β2 → · · · → βm−1 → βm → p also are in ∆. The degree of each of these formulas is less
than the degree of α → β and, by the induction hypothesis, all of them are true in w∆.
Thus w∆ β and w∆ α→ β.
As the []-area is empty, the sets Υpii are also empty. The counter-model only has two words,
w0 and w∆, following the properties described in Definition 6.
2. The top sequent is in any other branch that is not the rightmost one ([]-area is not empty).
Let α → β be a formula in M→ that is in ∆. We show that M w∆ α → β. In this case,
by the proof strategy, α ≡ (α1 → (α2 → · · · → (αm → q))), where q is the atomic formula
in the right side of the sequent, out of the []-area. By Definition 6.3 2w∆ q. By the proof
strategy, α1, α2, . . . , αm also are in ∆. The degree of each of these formulas is less than the
degree of α→ β and, by the induction hypothesis, all of them are true in w∆. This ensures
2w∆ α and w∆ α→ β.
Considering now a formula α→ β from M→ that is in Υpii . By Definition 6.2, α→ β also
belongs to ∆. From the last paragraph, we show that, for any formula α→ β ∈ ∆, 2w∆ α.
As 2w∆ α, by the accessibility relation of the Kripke model, 2wΥpi
i
α, for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Thus, the value of α → β is defined in any of these worlds by the value of α → β in w∆,
that we showed to be true. Thus, w
Υ
pi
i
α→ β.
As stated in Definition 6.2, Υp11 ⊆ Υ
p2
2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Υ
pn
n ⊆ ∆ and following the accessibility
relation rule of the M→ semantic (relations are reflexive and transitive) we conclude that:
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M w0 Υ
p1
1 ,2w0 p1
w0 Υ
p2
2 ,2w0 p2
...
w0 Υ
pn
n ,2w0 pn
w0 ∆,2w0 q
Proving Lemma 2.
Definition 7 A rule is said invertible or double-sound iff the validity of its conclusion implies
the validity of its premises.
In other words, by Definition 7 we know that a counter-model for a top sequent of a proof
tree which can not be expanded anymore can be used to construct a counter-model to every
sequent in the same branch of the tree until the conclusion (root sequent). In the case of the
→-right rule in our system, not just if the premise of the rule has a counter-model then so does
the conclusion, but the same counter-model will do. Weich (1998) called rules with this property
preserving counter model. Dyckhoff (personal communication, 2015) proposed to call this kind
of rules of strongly invertible rules. In the case of the →-left rule, this is the same when one of
the premises is valid, but, considering the case that both premises are not valid, we need to mix
the counter-models of both sides to construct the counter-model for the conclusion of the rule.
This way to produce counter-models is what we call a weakly invertible rule.
Lemma 3 The rules of LMT→are invertible.
Proof 6 We show that the rules of LMT→ are invertible when considering a proof tree labeled
in the schema presented in Section 4. We prove that for the structural rules (focus and restart)
and →-right, from the existence of a Kripke model that makes the premise of the rule invalid
follows that the conclusion is also invalid. For the →-left rule, from the Kripke models of the
premises, we can construct a Kripke model that also makes the conclusion of the rule invalid.
→-right If the premise is invalid, then there is a Kripke model M where ∆′,∆, α 2 β and
∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) 2 pi, for i = 1, . . . , n in a given world u of M. Thus, in the conclusion we have:
• By the definition of semantics of Section 2, there have to be a world v, u  v, in the model
M where ∆′,∆, α are satisfied and where β is not. Thus, in u, α→ β can not hold.
• By the model M, for each i, exists a world vi, u  vi, where vi Υ
pi
i and 2vi pi.
• Thus, the conclusion is also invalid.
→-left Considering that one of the premises of →-left is not valid, the conclusion also is.
We have to evaluate three cases:
1. The right premise is invalid but the left premise is valid. Then there is a Kripke
model M where α → β,∆′,∆, β 2 q and ∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) 2 pi, for i = 1, . . . , n from a given
world u. Thus, in the conclusion we have:
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• By the modelM, there have to be a world v, u  v, in the model where α→ β,∆′,∆, β
are satisfied and where q is not.
• By the model M, for each i, exists a world vi, u  vi, where vi Υ
pi
i and 2vi pi.
• Thus, the conclusion is invalid too.
2. The left premise is invalid but the right premise is valid. Then there is a Kripke
model M where α→ β,∆′,∆ 2 α and ∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) 2 pi, for i = 1, . . . , n, and ∆
q
2 q from
a given world u. Thus, in the conclusion we have:
• By the model M, there have to be a world v, u  v, in the model where α→ β,∆′,∆
are satisfied and where α is not.
• By the model M, for each i, exists a world vi, u  vi, where vi Υ
pi
i and 2vi pi.
• We also know by M that there is a world v∆q , u  v∆q , where v∆q ∆
q and 2v∆q q.
We also have that ∆q = ∆ and that α→ β ∈ ∆. Therefore, v∆q ∆
′ and v∆q α→ β.
• Thus, the conclusion can not be valid.
3. Both left and right premises are invalid. Then there are two models M1 and M2,
from the right and left premises respectively. InM1 there is a world u1 that makes the right
sequent invalid as described in item 1. In M2 there is a world u2 that makes the sequent
of the left premise invalid as described in item 2. Considering the way Kripke models are
constructed based on Lemma 2, we know that u1 and u2 are root worlds of their respective
counter-models. Thus, converting the two models into one, M3, by mixing u1 and u2 in
the root of M3, called u3, we have that in u3:
• α→ β,∆′,∆ are satisfied and α is not.
• for i = 1, . . . , n, we have that u3 Υ
pi
i and 2u3 pi.
• 2u3 q
• Thus, the conclusion is also invalid.
focus If we have a model that invalidates the premise, this model also invalidates the conclu-
sion as the sequents in the premise and in the conclusion are the same despite the repetition of
the focused formula α.
restart If the restart premise is invalid, then there is a Kripke model M and a world u from
which Υ1,Υ2, . . . ,Υi 2 pi and ∀j(
j⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) |= pj, for j = i + 1, . . . , n, and ∆
q
2 q. Thus, in the
conclusion we have:
• By the model M, there have to be a world v, u  v, in the model where Υ1,Υ2, . . . ,Υi are
satisfied and where pi is not. Each Υk has the same formulas as Υ
pk
k and, by the restart
condition, we know that 2 pk, for k = 1, . . . , i.
• By the model M, for each j, exists a world vj , u  vj, where vj Υ
pj
j and 2vj pj.
• We also know by M that there is a world vq, u  vq, where vq ∆
q and 2vq q. We also
have that ∆′ ⊆ ∆. Therefore, vq ∆
′.
• Thus, the conclusion is invalid.
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Now we can state a proposition about completeness of LMT→:
Proposition 3 LMT→ is complete regarding the proof strategy presented in Section 4
Proof 7 It follows direct from Proposition 3 (LMT→ terminates) and Lemma 2 (we can con-
struct a counter-model for a top sequent in a terminated open branch of LMT→) and Lemma 3
(the rules of LMT→ are invertible).
9 Counter-model Generation in Practice
As an example, we can consider the Dummett formula: (A→ B)∨ (B → A). It is known that a
Kripke counter-model that falsifies this formula need at least two branches in Int and Min, so
it is also in M→. This example allows us to understand how to mix the right and left premises
counter-models to falsifies a conclusion sequent of a →-left rule.
As we want to use LMT→, we need to convert the Dummett formula from the form above
to its implicational version. We use here the general translation presented in Haeusler (2015).
Thus, the translated version is a formula α as follows:
α ≡ (((A→ B)→ A)→ (((B → A)→ A)→ (C → A)))→
((((A→ B)→ B)→ (((B → A)→ B)→ (C → B)))→ C)
To shorten the presentation, consider the following abbreviations:
α1 = ((A→ B)→ A)→ (((B → A)→ A)→ (C → A))
α2 = ((A→ B)→ B)→ (((B → A)→ B)→ (C → B))
The tree (11), presents a shortened version of a totally expanded attempt proof tree in
LMT→for the Dummet formula in implicational formula. We concentrate in show the application
of the operational rules (→-left and →-right). We removed from the tree the focus area on the
left of each sequent and the applications of structural rules. We also exclude from the tree the
labeled formulas, just showing the necessary formulas for the specific point in the tree. The list
of sequents above the boxed sequents in the tree represent top sequents of each branch after the
total expansion of α2.
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. . .⇒ [B,C], A
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭✭
. . . , B ⇒ [C], B
. . .⇒ [C,B], B
. . . , A⇒ [C], B
. . .⇒ [C], C
. . . , B ⇒ [], C
. . .⇒ [C,A], A (M1)
. . . , B ⇒ [B,C], A
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭✭
. . . , B ⇒ [C], B
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭✭
. . . , B ⇒ [C,B], B
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭✭
. . . , B,A⇒ [C], B
. . . , B ⇒ [C], C
. . . , B ⇒ [], C
. . . , B ⇒ [C], A (M2)
. . . , A→ B ⇒ [C], A
. . . ,⇒ [C], (A→ B)→ A
. . .⇒ [B,C], A
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭✭
. . . , B ⇒ [C], B
. . .⇒ [C,B], B
. . . , A⇒ [C], B
. . .⇒ [C], C
. . . , B ⇒ [], C
. . .⇒ [C,A], q (M1)
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
. . . , A⇒ [C], A
. . . , B → A⇒ [C], A
. . . ,⇒ [C], (B → A)→ A
. . .⇒ [B,C], A
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭✭
. . . , B ⇒ [C], B
. . .⇒ [C,B], B
. . . , A⇒ [C], B
. . .⇒ [C], C
. . . , B ⇒ [], C
. . . ,⇒ [C], C (M1)
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭✭
. . . , A⇒ [B,C], A
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭✭
. . . , A,B ⇒ [C], B
. . . , A⇒ [C,B], B
. . . , A⇒ [C], B
. . . , A⇒ [C], C
. . . , A,B ⇒ [], C
. . . , A⇒ [], C (M3)
. . . , C → A⇒ [], C
. . . , ((B → A)→ A)→ (C → A)⇒ [], C
→ −left(α1,C)
((A→ B)→ A)→ (((B → A)→ A)→ (C → A)), α2 ⇒ [], C
α1, α2 ⇒ [], C
⇒ [], α1 → (α2 → C)
⇒ [], α
(11)
2
5
From the open branches of the tree (11) we extract the following three models. Models M1
repeats in some branches. Thus, we only represent it once here. We indicated in tree (11), in the
top sequents of each branch, the corresponding model generated on it, following the Definition 6.
M1
w0
w1
2 C
w11
2 B
w12
 A
w2
2 C
w21
2 B
w22
 B
w3
2 C
w31
 A
2 B
w4
2 C
w5
2 C
 B
M2
w′0
w′1
2 C
w′11
2 B
w′12
 B
2 A
w′2
2 C
w′21
 B
2 C
M3
w′′
0
w′′1
2 C
w′′
11
2 B
w′′
12
 A
2 B
w′′2
2 C
w′′
21
2 B
w′′
22
 A
w′′3
2 C
w′′
31
 A
2 C
w′′4
2 C
w′′
41
 A
2 B
2 C
Therefore, at the point in the tree where the rule→-left is applied to the context (α1, C) (the
single labeled rule application in the tree (11)) we have the join of these models. Counter-model
M4 below represent this unification (to legibility we remove repeated branches in M4). Thus,
M4 2 α:
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M4
w0∗
w1∗
2 C
w11∗
2 B
w12∗
 A
2 B
w2∗
2 C
w21∗
2 B
w22∗
2 A
 B
w3∗
2 C
w31∗
 A
2 B
2 C
w4∗
2 C
 B
w5∗
2 C
w51∗
 A
 B
2 C
10 Conclusion
We presented here the definition of a sequent calculus for proof search in the context of the
Propositional Minimal Implicational Logic (M→). Our calculus, called LMT→, aims to proceed
the proof search of M→ formulas in a bottom-up, forward-always approach. Termination of the
proof search is achieved without using loop checkers during the process. LMT→ is a deterministic
process, which means that the system does not need an explicit backtracking mechanism to be
complete. In this sense, LMT→ is a bicomplete process, generating Kripke counter-models from
search trees produced by unsuccess proving processes.
In the definition of the calculus, we also presented some translations between deductive
systems for M→: ND to LJ→ and LJ→ to LMT→. We also established a relation between
LMT→ and Fitting’s Tableaux Systems for M→regards the counter-model generation in those
systems.
We keep the development of a theorem prover for LMT→ in (https://github.com/jeffsantos/GraphProver).
As future work, we can enumerate some important features to be developed or extended in
the system as well as some new research topics that can be initialized.
• Precise upper bound for termination The upper bound used here for achieving ter-
mination in LMT→ is a very high bound. Many non-theorems can be identified in a small
number of steps. We can still explore options to shorten the size of the proof search tree.
Even in the case of theorems, our labeling mechanism in conjunction with the usage of the
restart rule produces many repetitions in the proof tree.
• Compression and sharing Following the techniques proposed by Gordeev and Haeusler
(2016) we can explore new ways to shorten the size of proofs generated by LMT→.
• Minimal counter-models The size of the generated counter-model in LMT→ still takes
into account every possible combination of subformulas, yielding Kripke models with quite
a lot worlds. There are still work to be done in order to produce smaller models. Stoughton
(1996) presents an implementation of the systems in Dyckhoff (1992) and in Pinto and Dyckhoff
(1995) with the property of “minimally sized, normal natural deduction of the sequent, or
it finds a ”small”, tree-based Kripke countermodel of the sequent” using the words of
the author. This reference can be a good start point to improve LMT→ counter-model
generation.
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